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The regime transformation of states in eastern Europe has contributed 
significantly to a redistribution of power at the system level. With a commensurate 
reduction in both threat perception and the aggressive display of national capabili-
ties, a context for a renewed interest in democracy was displayed not only in eastern 
Europe but the Middle East as well. As much of the world gears up for regional trade 
expansion in the twenty-first century, many in the Middle East recognize that the 
choices with the emergent confluence of forces are clear: resolve the contentious 
Arab-Israeli conflict and develop the region's potential, or fall far behind much of 
the developed world. 
It is widely agreed that sustained economic development requires an estab-
lished environment, certainly devoid of the disruption of terrorism and other forms 
of violence up to the ultimate level - war. From the Western democratic perspec-
tive, peace is the best way to achieve order and then onward to development. 
Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein have collected a set of empirically-supported 
research essays by American, Israeli and Palestinian contributors designed in a 
scholarly and serious way to do several things. First, there is an attempt to test the 
commonly held belief that democracies do not go to war with one another. Beyond 
this there are two other important considerations: can Israel remain a democracy 
when faced with continual threats of violence from external sources in the form of 
terrorism, while maintaining a military presence in the Occupied Territories? The 
final consideration addresses the possibility of the Palestinians creating a demo-
cratic polity. 
The book is divided logically into three parts. Initial attention is given to 
a theoretical approach to the relationship between democracy and peace. The 
question is raised: can democracy be established or maintained when national 
security issues are primary? With hindsight based on the extensiveness of the 
discussion, the authors express a belief that there is a need for a discussion of "the 
meaning of democracy in a Middle Eastern context." (p. 29) This theme, I believe, 
is provided succinctly elsewhere in Ellis Goldberg et al., Rules and Rights in the 
Middle East: Democracy, Law and Society (Seattle, WA: University of Washing-
ton Press, 1993). For the authors here, "[d]emocracy will come slowly to the 
Middle East, the forms and procedures appearing well before the beliefs and 
values that support them." (p. 302) The book concludes on an optimistic note, 
stating that "the presence of democracy in a Palestinian entity-state and perhaps 
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in other parts of the Arab world may increase shared interests in preserving 
domestic regimes by avoiding war and preserving the shared values and norms 
that make the absence of war possible." (p. 303) There is in this brief treatment, 
a tightly knit approach to a topic relevant to political theorists and comparativists 
worthy of scrutiny. 
The banal expression about being careful what you ask for because you 
may get it applies to the PLO as the current peace process moves on from its 
auspicious beginning in Madrid. For those who have not grown up with this 
Palestinian organization, it may appear that it is merely the only organized 
group representing this expatriated group. A sober examination by Barry 
Rubin, an Israeli political scholar, of the Palestinian group's strategy is done in 
a sound manner. 
Formed in 1964, the PLO served the Palestinians who sought to organize 
themselves as distinct from the Arab League in order to transform the Zionist entity 
to a purely Arab polity. Jerusalemite Arab elites were unable to develop a consensus 
about institutionalizing a political network during the British mandatory period, so 
that by 1948 the option of establishing some kind of a Palestinian political force had 
failed. Unable to mobilize political or diplomatic forces, the PLO resorted to using 
terrorism from bases in Lebanon and Jordan. The strategy of terrorism initiated by 
Yasir Arafat ultimately failed simply because Israel continued to exist. But also, as 
Rubin points out, Israel's continued existence failed to demonstrate to Palestinian 
supporters the organization's ability to succeed. A further shock was sustained 
when the PLO was expelled from Jordan after it threatened the monarchy and it 
migrated to Lebanon. 
The opposition of the PLO to Western interests also meant a lack of 
appreciation of Western-style and initiated diplomatic initiatives. While the 
public image of the PLO as a representative body captured the imagination of the 
public, it did little in real terms. It was an uprising from below, the intifada, that 
secured a place for a loyal opposition at the level of the volk. In 1988, the Palestine 
National Congress issued a declaration of independence for a Palestine without 
a geographical setting. As Rubin so simply but cogently notes, the PLO's ability 
to survive contains within it the kernel of its own vulnerability; the overall 
organization is a coalition of quasi autonomous groups whose loyalty is fre-
quently greater to some Arab state than it is to the personal leadership of Yasir 
Arafat. The unity of the group has been ideological in nature: to destroy Israel 
through armed struggle and establish an independent Palestinian state, taking in 
all of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Adherence to the ultimate aims 
thus permitted any one member to sublimate any reservations over the use of 
terrorism as a tactic. But while the PLO's strategy might be considered faulty, 
unable to achieve its goal, the strengths of the PLO's leadership amalgam was 
sufficient to deny Israel its goal of splitting its ranks. By September 1993, when 
a peaceful resolution gained momentum through the employment of external 
diplomatic support, the conflictual issues began in earnest. Rubin takes the 
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discussion of the PLO through the peace process of Madrid and Oslo and 
concludes as he might have at numerous junctures during the equally dangerous 
mandatory period: the PLO has the ability to resolve its difficulties with Israel at 
anytime it's willing to accept the Western rules of diplomacy and compromise. 
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